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“I hope that with all the problems and 
illness this has caused, people will realise 
that there is a much bigger lesson to be 
learnt. What lockdown has demonstrated 
is that we can make massive changes 
quickly and with one another we can 
make things better.” 
– Renew Normal contributor; 40s; South East England
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INTRODUCTION
Britain needs a comprehensive 
plan to Build Back Stronger 
after the Covid-19 crisis: 
building up families and 
communities as well as the 
economy, and strengthening 
our ability as a people and 
as a nation to adapt to the 
shocks of the future.
Drawing on the contributions of 50,000 citizens, this 
paper is a blueprint for a stronger, more resilient, 
and more united nation. This report sets out how we 
can rebuild consensus about Britain’s future with an 
aspirational agenda crowdsourced from the public 
themselves.
At the core of our approach is a fundamental belief 
that the only way forward after a crisis is through 
consensus and collaboration. We understand that 
this is contentious. For many people, what matters 
most in a democracy is the competition of ideas. 
One side wins, and the other loses. For many 
political activists, consensus is at best the slow road 
to change, and at worst a by-word for surrender.
But the outbreak of Covid-19 has caused trauma and 
upheaval on a scale that has only ever happened 
in times of war. Our economy has taken a hit three 
times the size of the global financial crisis. Ambitious 
but expensive plans for levelling up growth between 
the regions of the UK, decarbonising our economy, 
or improving funding for our health and social care 
systems look more important, but less affordable, 
than ever. To recover at all, let alone to meet our 
ambitions, we need to act together. 
The Renew Normal process - the People’s 
Commission on Life After Covid-19 - was designed 
to identify and campaign for a political agenda that 
would help us do exactly that. We have mapped 
hundreds of possibilities to identify a policy pathway 
that will bridge political divides: a reform agenda 
that can unite everyone, even groups with radically 
different perspectives on the future.
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OUR APPROACH
Renew Normal has been a national conversation, 
from April 2020 to February 2021, on how the United 
Kingdom should change in the light of the Covid-19 
pandemic. 
Our goal in conducting this work was to involve 
as many members of the public as possible in 
a programme to identify the ways in which this 
experience has changed our lives, and what that 
should mean for the future of our country. After 
years of political division over Brexit, Demos and 
the Renew Normal Commissioners believed that 
we needed to build consensus about the future, 
bridging divides through a process of consultation, 
engagement, and collaboration.
In Phase 1, from May - June 2020, our open access 
survey collected stories and insights about life 
under lockdown from nearly 12,000 people and 
mapped the practical and policy changes that had 
been most influential during this period. Our report, 
Britain Under Lockdown, showed this period was 
characterised by deep emotions - fear, joy, outrage, 
anxiety, compassion and more. Crucially, the research 
laid bare the extraordinary diversity of experiences: 
whether on health, home working, housing, or 
volunteering: what was liberating for some was a 
huge burden for others.
We followed this in September 2020 with Phase 2: 
a large-scale nationally representative poll of over 
10,000 people that enabled us to identify how good 
and bad experiences had affected people across a 
range of demographics. The report, Divided Britain, 
showed that pre-existing inequality had had an 
enormous impact on people’s ability to get through 
the challenges of the pandemic. From financial 
outcomes to healthy eating; from anxiety and 
wellbeing to the risks of catching Covid-19 or losing 
a loved one, the picture was the same: the poorer 
you were, the worse your experience.
Phase 2 also enabled us to identify the ways in which 
opinion and expectation had changed about how 
Britain should be in the future, using Polis (detailed 
below). This enabled us to focus the final stages of 
Renew Normal on the eight issues where it seemed 
there’d been the most dramatic changes - the issues 
on which there is the potential for consensus about 
future reform. That does not mean these are the only 
issues with which public policy should be concerned 
post-pandemic. Social care and NHS funding remain 
vitally important to address, for example. We chose 
our priority areas based on the strength of shifts in 
opinion.
The areas our research identified were:
• Key workers and low pay





• Trade and economic resilience
• Inequality
We consulted with the public and experts on each 
of these topics to identify a policy agenda for 
reform. This report sets out the conclusions of those 
consultations, and the six overarching lessons we 
believe need to be drawn from this process as a 
whole.
BRIDGING DIVIDES
At the start of the pandemic, it seemed there was 
one silver lining among the clouds: after years of 
political division and animosity, the country came 
together behind a common purpose. At the political 
and the community level, we were united. Within a 
few short months, that spirit had dissipated. Now, 
a year since the first lockdown measures were put 
into place, and as the end finally comes into sight, 
divisions are as raw as they ever were.
We knew that this pandemic would cause far-
reaching, unparalleled change. We knew what for 
some was a period of nuisance pushed others into 
catastrophic hardship. We knew, even in the early 
days, that it risked dividing campaigners, if not 
the population at large, into tribes – those who 
wanted to go back as quickly as possible to the way 
things were, and those who wanted to leap forward 
and allow the experience to transform our lives 
permanently. Bridging that divide was never going 
to be easy, and after a year of anger, frustration, 
boredom and anxiety, many people will find it hard 
to develop empathy for those who disagree with 
them. We risk greater division.
For the last year, Demos has been pioneering the 
use of a new online tool for public participation in 
policy: Polis. Originally developed in the US, but first 
deployed in Taiwan, Polis enables us to take a new 
approach to building consensus that has been vital 
in drawing together the policy agenda for Renew 
Normal. Polis is an interactive survey format which 
allows respondents to do more than just answer the 
questions: they can also submit questions for others 
to answer. It therefore enables us to crowdsource 
ideas directly from the public.
Polis separates respondents to the survey into two 
groups, according to the answers they give - we 
call them Group A and Group B. This initially has a 
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polarising effect: it creates groups that are effectively 
as divergent as possible. Crucially, however, it also 
empowers us to identify what - if any - statements or 
opinions bridge that divide. If Group A and Group B 
represent divided tribes, then those statements on 
which they agree are bridges of empathy between 
them. 
A policy agenda built on those bridges of empathy 
has the best chance of bringing together a divided 
population in the months and years to come. That is 
what this report proposes.
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This report contains a number of sections, reporting 
on the consultations and research we have 
conducted, and drawing them together to form 
conclusions. There are three main parts:
1. Findings. This section reports on the conclusions 
of our consultations and research on the seven 
topics identified by the public as priority areas 
for change.
• Low paid and key workers
• Our approach to trade and resilience
• The future of home working
• Online life and misinformation
• Communities and volunteering
• Access to green space
• Inequality
2. Lessons from Covid-19. This section takes the 
findings and identifies five cross-cutting lessons 
from our experience over the last year.
• There’s consensus for change. Don’t 
pretend this didn’t happen.
• Level up people, not just places.
• Community makes us stronger, not just 
happier.
• Remote working and online shopping are 
here to stay. We have to adapt.
• We need to redesign the places where we 
live and work.
3. Build Back Stronger. This section shows how 
pursuing the policy recommendations identified 
in this process will help build up national 
resilience. It makes the case that this narrative - 
Build Back Stronger - has the best potential to 
unite the country behind a post-Covid renewal 
plan.
The report concludes with a short section drawing 
together all the policy recommendations included in 
the paper as a whole.
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FINDINGS
This section summarises the 
findings of the consultation 
process on the eight topics 
we explored in the final phase 
of Renew Normal. 
On each, we identify the key insights from the 
process - though Online Life and Misinformation are 
presented together as a single sub-section. We then 
identify both the policy and political risks ahead on 
this agenda. On each topic - with the exception of 
inequality - we then present the findings of the Polis 
survey, identifying the key areas of consensus. We 
then put forward the outline of a policy agenda.
Demos is also working on a number of additional 
programmes that have emerged from the 
Renew Normal process, including a major public 
deliberation on the food system; an analysis of the 
future of urban spaces, based on modelling of future 
commuting and spending patterns; and our ongoing 
Workshift Commission.
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LOW PAID AND KEY WORKERS
Insights: We value key workers more, and 
are more worried about low pay.
From the start of our public engagement work, it was 
clear that there has been a shift in how the public 
sees low paid and key workers. In our first open 
access survey, this was one of the most common 
issues identified by respondents as an issue on 
which they had changed their minds. For many 
respondents, their perception of what constitutes 
valuable work had changed in the light of the 
coronavirus and the critical nature of contributions 
from health workers, bus drivers and people who 
work in essential shops.1
It is not surprising that our research suggests 
there is now demand among the public for better 
recognition for these workers. Our polling found that 
94% of the public say they think low paid workers 
have been important during the pandemic. 68% say 
low paid workers have been “very important”, while 
only 40% say they believed this before the pandemic 
- strong evidence of a shift in attitudes.2 There also 
appears to be strong public support for better pay 
for low paid workers and a more generous social 
safety net.
1 Demos open-access survey, August 2020.
2 Demos polling, September 2020.
3 Demos polling, September 2020.
4 Living Wage Foundation. Low Pay Spotlight: Public Sector, 2020. Available at https://www.livingwage.org.uk/news/low-pay-spotlight-public-
sector [accessed 7/12/2020]
5 Demos polling, September 2020.
We found very strong support for better pay and 
conditions for the low paid, even if this leads to 
downsides: seven in ten (71%) would be willing to 
pay higher taxes and prices to provide better pay 
and conditions for low paid workers.3 This appears 
to be a shift from pre-pandemic levels: in February 
2019, Survation found 64% of the public believed 
all public sector workers should be uplifted to the 
real Living Wage.4 Our question asked the public 
to accept a substantial trade-off - higher taxes and 
prices - and yet still found a substantially higher 
proportion of the public were willing to support this 
change.
Support for better pay and conditions for low paid 
workers is also remarkably consistent across different 
socioeconomic and demographic groups; we found 
relatively little variation in attitudes by age, gender 
or income.5 Indeed, as the chart below shows, 
attitudes are extremely consistent across different 
voter groups. For example, 72% of Labour voters 
and 70% of Conservative voters at the last General 
Election support better pay and conditions for low 
paid workers, even if it means higher taxes and 
prices. This suggests that this agenda could build 
bridges across the electorate and is likely to enjoy a 
wide coalition of support.







I WOULD PREFER LOW PAID
WORKERS TO HAVE WORSE PAY
AND CONDITIONS IF IT MEANS
LOWER TAXES AND PRICES
I WOULD PREFER LOW PAID
WORKERS TO HAVE THE SAME
PAY AND CONDITIONS AS THEY
DID BEFORE THE PANDEMIC, WITH
NO IMPACT ON TAXES OR PRICES
I WOULD PREFER LOW PAID
WORKERS TO HAVE BETTER PAY
AND CONDITIONS, EVEN IF








There is also strong evidence for a change in 
consensus opinion about the safety net and the 
welfare state. A clear majority (57%) want benefits for 
the unemployed and low paid to be more generous 
after the pandemic than they were before.6 The 
British Social Attitudes Survey 35 reported that only 
20% of the public wanted higher benefits for the 
unemployed, and 31% wanted wages topped up for 
low income couples without children.7 BSA reported 
much higher support for benefits for couples 
with children and lone parents (58% and 70% 
respectively), but our survey did not rely on reference 
to children to secure support for increased benefits. 
Risks: Tread carefully to maintain consensus 
on tax; it’s potentially divisive to offer 
special treatment to key workers.
There are of course risks associated with developing 
an agenda to increase wages and the social safety 
net, and improve the recognition of key workers 
- first and foremost maintaining consensus for the 
fiscal costs of any increase in benefits, or public 
sector pay. In A People’s Budget, published by 
Demos and the Standard Life Foundation last year, 
we identified strong public consensus for tax rises, so 
long as the lowest paid are insulated and everyone 
pays a fair share.8 
The economic consensus remains that any tax 
rises would be best timed once the economy 
has recovered more fully, but across the political 
spectrum the public is willing to support those tax 
rises, when they are needed. 
A greater risk, when it comes to the public, is a split 
between public and private sector workers in terms 
of recognition and reward for the Covid-19 response. 
While NHS workers have been at the frontline, 
offering extraordinary care and service for which we 
are all grateful, it has been apparent during this crisis 
that it is not only public sector key workers on whom 
we depend. The most obvious example is the care 
sector: the majority of care is provided by people 
on extremely low pay, often with weak employment 
protections and limited sick pay, working in public 
service and yet technically in the private sector. But 
without carers in the community and care homes, 
the impact of the pandemic on the vulnerable would 
have been incalculably greater.
Other essential workers include those in the public 
sector like teachers and police officers; people 
6 Demos polling, November 2020.
7 Phillips, D., Curtice, J., Phillips, M. and Perry, J. British Social Attitudes: The 35th Report. British Social Attitudes, 2018. Available at https://
www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39284/bsa35_full-report.pdf  [accessed 7/12/2020]
8 Glover, B. and Seaford, C. A People’s Budget: How the Public Would Raise Taxes. Demos, 2020. Available at https://demos.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/A-Peoples-Budget-Sept-2020-v5.pdf [accessed 23/02/2021]
9 Demos Polis, September 2020.
10 Demos Polis, September 2020.
11 Papoutsaki, D. and Wilson, T. Covid-19 and the low paid: Early analysis of Labour Force Survey. Institute for Employment Studies, 2020. 
Available at https://www.employment-studies.co.uk/resource/covid-19-and-low-paid-early-analysis-labour-force-survey [accessed 19/2/2021]
employed in outsourced public services including 
bus drivers, postal workers and refuse collectors; and 
millions in the private sector including retail and farm 
workers, delivery drivers and broadband engineers.
Our Polis exercise found many of the public are wary 
of any kind of special treatment for key workers. 
We found high levels of division over the principle 
of ‘special treatment’ - the statement: “It would 
be unfair for key workers to get special treatment 
compared with non-key workers” was highly divisive. 
The public were highly divided on even modest 
examples of ‘special treatment’ for key workers, 
such as cheaper access to public amenities (e.g. 
swimming pools and gyms) and additional travel 
discounts. But they were united in their opposition 
to more substantive forms of special treatment: we 
found united and strong opposition across attitudinal 
groups - including those most open to special 
treatment - to the statement: “Key workers should 
be able to access more generous benefits than non-
key workers from the government if they become 
unemployed.”9
This could be because the public are concerned 
about potentially dividing workers into the ‘useful’ 
and ‘less useful’. We found moderate consensus 
support for the statement (submitted by a 
participant): “In order to discuss key workers we 
must first define what a key worker is - and this risks 
dividing society into the ‘useful’ and ‘useless’”.10
This adds up to a strong case that efforts to reward 
those who contributed to the Covid-19 effort cannot 
be concentrated on the public sector or any specific 
sub-group of key workers. Many will make the case 
for a public sector pay rise on its own merits, but 
our evidence suggests that it would be a mistake to 
argue for this as a core component of a post-Covid 
settlement. Instead, we believe the focus should be 
on low pay across the board, in both the public and 
private sectors. 
The economic case for this is also stronger: it is the 
low paid who have borne the brunt of the financial 
impacts of the crisis. A study from July 2020 by the 
Institute of Employment Studies found that the low 
paid had, even by that stage of the pandemic, seen 
a significant fall in employment, with no change for 
those in higher-paying jobs.11 By contrast, many 
higher paid key workers (just like higher paid non-
essential workers) have seen an increase in their 
disposable income: 42% report having been able to 
save and more than six in ten key workers say their 
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household has been “very” or “relatively financially 
comfortable” during the pandemic.12 
Policy proposals
The policy agenda on key workers should be focused 
on low pay, improving the safety net, and investment 
in training to help people progress out of low paid 
jobs. The government should be considering:
Tackling low pay with:
• Increases in the minimum wage, and improved 
enforcement.
• Prioritising low paid public sector workers for a 
significant pay rise, including targeted funding to 
enable higher pay in private companies delivering 
public services, such as care.
Improving the safety net by:
• Extending sick pay to low paid workers.
• Increasing the rate of sick pay. 
• Making permanent the £20-a-week increase 
in Universal Credit, pending a wider review of 
sustainable welfare spending.
12 Jooshandeh, J. and Lockey, A. All Clapped Out? Key Workers Living Through Lockdown. RSA, 2020. Available at https://www.thersa.org/
globalassets/reports/2020/rsa-briefing-all-clapped-out.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
Improving opportunities and productivity with:
• A new education and training offer for all low paid 
workers.
• A statutory entitlement to paid learning leave. 
OUR APPROACH TO TRADE AND 
RESILIENCE
Insights: We want to be better protected 
against disasters and shortages, even if it 
costs more.
The early stages of the pandemic and lockdown 
were dominated by discussions about shortages: 
from essential PPE to pasta and toilet paper. Empty 
shelves and food rationing were an unprecedented 
experience for most of the population, and never 
before had we needed to worry about glove, apron 
and mask supplies for our medical professionals. 
Add this to the knowledge that the pandemic had 
spread so quickly across the world because of our 
interconnectedness - humans travelling across 
borders - and it’s no surprise that many people told 
us they’d changed their minds about how important 
it is for Britain to be self-sufficient. Many respondents 
to our open access survey felt they’d had enough of 
globalisation.
POLIS: KEY WORKERS
The UK relies on 




Key workers should not be able 
to access more generous 
unemployment benefits than 
other workers
Low paid workers should be given 
access to free adult education to help 
them get the skills and qualifications 
they need
All key workers should have a 
structured career path with widely 
recognised and desirable qualifications
All low paid workers 
should be able to access 
statutory sick pay
Increasing the minimum 
wage will address many 
of the issues faced by 
key workers
It would be unfair for key workers 
to get special treatment 
compared with non-key workers
Key workers should not be able 
to access public amenities at a 
lower cost than other members of 
the public
Low paid key workers should not 
receive more travel discounts 
than they currently do
Do not support a significant pay 
rise for low paid workers, even if 
it means an increase in the cost of 
living
Not willing to pay higher taxes to 
ensure low paid key workers can 
receive a pay rise
It would be fair for key workers to 
get special treatment compared 
with non-key workers
Key workers should be able to 
access public amenities at a lower 
cost than other members of the 
public
Low paid key workers should 
receive more travel discounts 
than they currently do
Support a significant pay rise for 
low paid workers, even if it means 
an increase in the cost of living
Willing to pay higher taxes to 
ensure low paid key workers can 
receive a pay rise
GROUP A GROUP B
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In our nationally representative polling, some six in 
ten supported policies to: “reduce the amount of 
products being imported to Britain, to help boost 
British industries and help the country become more 
self-sufficient, even if it cost more and reduced the 
choice of products.”13
But this is a subtle shift in public opinion and 
priorities, not a sea change. There is no indication 
in our data that the British public want us to pull up 
our borders or go for total self-sufficiency. The focus 
is on essential supplies, and better preparedness for 
disasters. We asked people whether they thought it 
was important for the UK to be “self-sufficient so that 
we don’t have to rely on other countries to source 
essential supplies (even if this means things are more 
expensive or less efficient during normal times)”. 
30% of people said this had been very important 
to them before the pandemic, but 41% said it was 
very important now. In other words, this is newly 
important to about one in ten of us.14
It is also clear that people’s enthusiasm for increased 
resilience is not blind to the trade-offs or costs 
involved. 52% were willing to support or strongly
13 Demos polling, November 2020.
14 Demos polling, September 2020.
15 Demos polling, November 2020.
16 Demos Polis, October 2020.
support the idea of the government “spending a lot 
of money on preparing for potential future disasters, 
even if they are unlikely to happen and the money 
would be wasted if they do not happen.” Only 13% 
opposed this approach.15
This may be because of increased fears that disasters 
will become more frequent. In our Polis consultation, 
86% agreed that: “What used to be thought of as 
a rare disaster now seems to happen with more 
frequency e.g. flooding as a result of climate change 
and erosion.”16
Risks: We may lapse back into polarising 
debate because of Brexit, even though 
there are huge areas of public consensus.
There is a huge political risk associated with the 
way trade policy is dealt with in Westminster. Many 
assume that trade policy, or this debate about ‘just-
in-time’ supply chains is a naturally divisive issue, 
simply because it is so closely aligned to the Brexit 
debate. But on all of these issues, our research 
showed there was very little divergence between 
POLIS: TRADE AND RESILIENCE
We need better 
disaster planning 
which enables us to 









also ensure a buffer 
against ‘just in time’ 
supply chains for 
critical goods
The economic impact of 
Covid-19 is an opportunity 
for the UK to find a new 
approach that relies less 
on the EU as a trading 
partner
After the pandemic, British 
consumers have a duty to 
buy British products where 
they are available
The pandemic shows the need 
for countries to be able to act 
more independently and not be 
reliant on other countries
In the wake of Covid-19, 
the UK should become less 
reliant on international 
trade
The economic impact of 
Covid-19 means the UK 
needs to rely more on the 
EU as a trading partner
British consumers do not 
always have a duty to buy 
British products where they 
are available
The pandemic does not 
show the need for countries 
to be able to act more 
independently and not be 
reliant on other countries
We should not reduce the 
money Britain gives in 
foreign aid
GROUP A GROUP B
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self-identified Leave voters and Remain voters. Both 
back greater resilience and preparedness, even at 
cost to themselves
We divided responses to the Polis into two broad 
attitudinal groups, A and B.17 Group A is more 
internationalist, in favour of global cooperation 
and interdependence, and less inclined to view the 
economy in terms of patriotism. Group B is more 
nationalist, in favour of economic independence, 
and inclined to view the economy patriotically. As an 
example of the extent of the divide: 91% of Group B 
believe Britain shouldn’t rely on other countries, as a 
point of principle - while only 28% of Group A agree. 
Yet there are a substantial number of issues on 
which both groups agree: notably the environment 
and labour standards. More than two-thirds of each 
would “buy more goods produced in the UK to 
help the environment, even if they cost more than 
imported alternatives”, and more than 80% of each 
would like to impose tariffs on countries who build 
coal fired power plants. There was even greater 
agreement on trying to keep out goods produced by 
exploited workers: about 90% of each group would 
like to do so.
Of course, these public ambitions come with their 
own risks: under WTO rules, our ability to impose 
restrictions or non-tariff barriers is very limited. 
Furthermore, the reality may be that we will secure 
greater resilience by diversifying our trade networks 
than by on-shoring production or warehousing 
(storing up goods for sale or distribution later on). 
There is a risk of over-correcting our stance on 
globalisation - a more protectionist approach would 
come with economic costs and greater political 
division.
Nevertheless, it is helpful to understand that there 
is public consensus even across the open-closed 
political divide. There is no reason to seek a divisive 
narrative on the future of trade policy, and a nuanced 
approach to boosting resilience in the context of 
‘Global Britain’ has every chance of winning public 
support.
Policy proposals: Avoid divisive narratives 
to build consensus on a long term approach 
to trade and resilience.
In May 2020 the government launched Project 
Defend, to increase supply chain resilience for 
essential goods and services and protect our 
technology infrastructure. We support this approach 
as a vital part of improving our ability to withstand 
shocks in the future. This is one of the issues on 
17 Demos Polis, October 2020.
18 ONS. Coronavirus and homeworking in the UK: April 2020. 2020. Available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/
peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/coronavirusandhomeworkingintheuk/april2020 [accessed 19/2/2021]
19 Demos polling, November 2020.
20 PwC. PwC Survey: 80% of companies anticipate remote work as the new norm on the labour market. 2020. Available at https://www.pwc.ro/
en/press-room/press-release-2020/pwc-survey--80--of-companies-anticipate-remote-work-as-the-new-n.html [accessed 19/2/2021]
which opinion has shifted most substantially and the 
public will expect to see a visible, measurable shift in 
our approach as a nation.
In addition, we recommend the government:
• Engages with the public in a consensus-building 
process, such as a citizens’ assembly, on the future 
direction of UK trade policy
• Engages with other countries on the reform 
of multilateral institutions to provide greater 
protection and security against future shocks
• Publishes wider information on the expected 
impacts of a range of possible future shocks, 
opening this process up to greater public scrutiny 
and challenge.
As we argue later in this paper, it is also vital that 
we go beyond the question of supply chains in 
considering the real nature of national resilience. 
Turn to the Build Back Stronger section below for our 
proposed new model of resilience.
THE FUTURE OF HOME WORKING
Insights: Most of those who worked from 
home want to carry on, at least part of the 
time, because it made many of us happier 
and more productive.
2020 saw remote working on a scale like no other: 
for almost the entire year, many people in the UK, 
where possible, worked from home. Between three 
and four in ten were working remotely most of the 
year.18 
This huge experiment has had profound effects 
on our lives. It has challenged many assumptions 
about the way we work, not least how to maintain a 
productive and happy workforce. While the future is 
still uncertain, it seems likely from our research that 
a huge number of people will carry on working from 
home, at least for part of the working week. Among 
those who have worked from home during the 
pandemic, the majority (51%) want to continue doing 
so more in the future than they did pre-pandemic.19
Of course, employers might challenge that ambition 
if they want to get back to the operating model they 
used before, and there is some anecdotal evidence 
that the 2021 lockdown has been more difficult for 
remote workers. Nevertheless, data collected by 
PwC about employers worldwide found that 80% of 
the companies they surveyed are adopting remote 
work as the new norm.20 Similarly, a CBI survey of 
its members found that only 28% of its members 
expected to work entirely or mostly in the office in 
the future, while a much larger proportion are in 
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favour of splitting remote working evenly between 
the home and the office (47%).21 The survey also 
finds a significant change in mindset in favour of 
more flexible working patterns. 
One of the benefits to employers of a remote or 
hybrid model is actually the benefit to remote 
workers themselves. There is strong evidence 
to suggest that it has improved wellbeing and 
community engagement for many of those who were 
able to work in this way. 
Remote workers have been more likely to improve 
their exercise habits, spending habits, physical health 
and mental health, than those who have not been 
working from home.22 Further, those who have always 
worked from home have been more likely to report 
they were “much better” than just “a little better”, 
suggesting that for some the positives have been felt 
acutely. For example, over a third of people always 
working from home said that their mental health got 
“much better” (35%) - almost twice the proportion of 
those who “never” worked from home. Those who 
had been working from home were also more likely 
to volunteer (25% vs. 13%) and feel more connected 
to their local community (52% vs. 46%), than those 
who did not work from home during the pandemic.23 
Risks: This change risks widening divides - 
between those who have to commute and 
those who don’t, and places with lots of 
workers and places without. And we might 
waste money trying (and failing) to stop 
this trend.
With demonstrably strong public support for some 
form of continued remote working - both from 
employees and employers - it is clear that to some 
degree there is no turning back. But this comes with 
three clear risks, which Demos is exploring both 
through our Workshift Commission and our work on 
the future of urban spaces.
First, it’s clear that remote working doesn’t work 
for everyone, or every business. Younger and 
poorer people are less likely to have access to a 
quiet working environment or a good broadband 
connection. Employers that move to hybrid or 
remote-dominated working schedules will need 
to ensure they’re not just pushing costs onto staff, 
instead providing office facilities or covering the 
costs of a home office, to enable people to work 
well. This will require new thinking, and potentially 
new employment rights.
There are huge practical consequences too, explored 
in Demos’ recent paper by Julia Hobsbawm, the 
Nowhere Office. Remote working can make it 
21 CBI. No Turning Back. 2020. Available at https://www.cbi.org.uk/media/5855/no-turning-back.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
22 Demos polling, November 2020.
23 Demos polling, November 2020.
harder to collaborate, explore, or be creative with 
colleagues. It can reduce social connections with 
teams, affecting the social capital that can be part of 
employee retention. We can expect companies, over 
time, to find a range of models that work and enable 
them to attract and retain talent, but this won’t be 
simple or easy.
Second, policy makers often discuss the hourglass 
labour market: low-paid jobs at the bottom, high 
paid jobs at the top, but too few opportunities to 
progress from one to the other. Sustained increases 
in remote working could create a second hourglass, 
with a big divide between those who can work 
flexibly and those who cannot. On one side will be 
workers with no or low commuting costs, cheap 
lunches at home in their kitchens, and potentially 
flexible hours. On the other side of the hourglass 
will be those who have to commute, eat out or pack 
a lunch, and are far less likely to get to choose their 
working hours.
This isn’t simple: we’ve already noted that some 
people hate working from home, and are far happier 
travelling to an office, construction site, factory or 
hospital, for their job. This isn’t a problem where 
people have agency over their employment choices. 
But we can expect serious political and social 
ramifications if we effectively see two labour markets 
develop: one with high pay, low costs and high 
flexibility, another with low pay, high costs, and low 
flexibility, and very few pathways between them.
Third, one of those consequences will be economic. 
Forthcoming research conducted by Demos has 
shown that a shift to remote working among higher 
income workers could lead to further economic 
divergence between rich and poorer areas. Higher 
income areas will have a substantially increased 
number of workers who stay local - instead of 
commuting to city centres as they did in the past 
- and will spend more locally, helping those local 
shops and services to thrive. In poorer communities, 
the effect is smaller so those high streets will not 
experience the uplift to the same extent.
This is not the only economic risk. Our urban spaces 
may have to undergo substantial transformation 
to find new uses for an oversupply of both office 
space and services - like food and retail - which were 
used by office workers who aren’t returning. Public 
transport networks have lost huge amounts of fare 
revenue during the pandemic; if commuter volumes 
don’t recover, some routes may become unviable 
or need greater subsidies. If fares rise, it is likely to 
affect poorer workers, who are still commuting, the 
most. 
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Our Polis consultation explored the political 
dynamics of these risks.24 We identified two groups: 
remote working enthusiasts (Group A) and remote 
working moderates (Group B). This is the first insight: 
no-one thinks this is a trend we should fight to stop. 
In fact, there was relatively strong consensus that the 
government shouldn’t incentivise people to go back 
to offices.
There was strong support among both groups for 
employers using remote working as a way to widen 
the talent pool, and that employees should be given 
more opportunities to re-skill, in light of increased 
remote working opportunities. In addition, there 
was consensus that businesses should play a role in 
footing the additional costs - such as heating and 
broadband - paid by employees due to increased 
homeworking. 
Finally, there was consensus that flexible working 
should be about more than location. Above, we 
identified the risk of an hourglass economy with 
huge flexibility for some, and none for everyone else. 
Leaning into public opinion by pursuing policies to 
expand flexible working for everyone would help 
balance that risk.
24 Demos Polis, October 2020.
25 Demos polling, November 2020.
Policy proposals: Promote flexibility in all 
parts of the labour market, and support the 
economy through this transition.
Government should abandon efforts to intervene 
in the market and persuade or incentivise office 
workers back to their old patterns. Instead, it should 
support people through the transition.
Flexible hours are overall more important to the 
population than the ability to work from home.25 
We suggest that government should work with 
industry, sector by sector, to identify ways to improve 
flexibility and ensure the lessons learned from this 
pandemic can spread to the whole economy. This 
will be important for economic recovery: we know 
increased flexibility in the workforce, from being 
able to work remotely to holding different hours, can 
enable more people to enter or re-enter the labour 
market.  
The Civil Service and public sector could lead the 
way on using remote working to support the levelling 
up agenda, with a drive to increase remote working 
opportunities in areas where there are limited labour 
market opportunities. 
When it comes to managing the consequences 
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expect the government to take a role in driving 
the transformation of city centres.26 The market 
will, of course, drive much change. But the social 
consequences of unmanaged decline and derelict 
buildings are profound: active strategies will be 
needed to minimise this risk. Below, we look at the 
role community groups could play in redesigning 
places and the importance of expanding access to 
green space as part of any civic redesign.
ONLINE LIFE AND MISINFORMATION
Insights: Many people have valued the 
move to doing more things digitally, so this 
shift will stick even though it doesn’t work 
for everyone.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, people found 
that digital tools and the online world offered new 
possibilities for new ways of living, and for many, this 
increase in freedom and choice is something they are 
keen to preserve. The message from our research is 
clear: the internet has brought significant benefits for 
many people during the pandemic. 
In our open access survey, a majority of respondents 
said that they relied more on technology and the 
internet during the pandemic than before, and that 
they had learned to use a new technology.27 Many 
people shared their stories of using the internet 
during lockdown to keep in touch with family and 
friends, to join exercise classes, social events, watch 
theatre, go to church, learn new skills and connect 
with their communities.
The poll found that over half of people (51%) 
think that the greater use of, and reliance on, new 
technologies during the pandemic (e.g. video 
conferencing apps such as Zoom or Microsoft Teams) 
has been a good thing for them personally (vs. just 
8% who said it was bad), and 61% think that it has 
been a good thing for the country.28 WhatsApp and 
Facebook groups set up over the pandemic helped 
communities support each other, as well as enabling 
the training of hundreds of people around the UK to 
work to organise community support. 
Demos research has shown that 77% of the UK adult 
public use online learning at work, with benefits for 
skills, expertise and efficiency.29 During lockdown, as 
people were furloughed or made redundant, online 
learning in many cases became a central part of 
life. Over the last 12 months, the Open University 
26 Demos Polis, October 2020.
27 Demos open-access survey, August 2020.
28 Demos polling, September 2020.
29 Lasko-Skinner, R. How the internet could transform the labour market for the better. Demos, 2020. Available at https://demos.co.uk/blog/
how-the-internet-could-transform-the-labour-market-for-the-better/ [accessed 19/2/2021]
30 The Open University. Data: Adobe Analytics 1.3.19 – 25.2.21
31 Bibby and Leavey, 2020 in, Stone, E. and others, Digital Inclusion in Health and Care: Lessons learned from the NHS Widening 
Digital Participation Programme (2017-2020). Good Things Foundation, 2020. Available at https://www.goodthingsfoundation.org/sites/
default/files/research-publications/digital_inclusion_in_health_and_care-_lessons_learned_from_the_nhs_widening_digital_participation_
programme_2017-2020__0.pdf [accessed 23.02.21]
32 Demos Polis, September 2020.
33 Good Things Foundation. Digital Nation UK 2020. 2020. Available at https://www.goodthingsfoundation.org/sites/default/files/research-
publications/digital-nation-2020.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
has seen an increase of 77% in visitors to their 
OpenLearn platform.30 Access to essential services 
also shifted online. Health services saw a huge rise 
in use of online services - with online consultations 
doubling in March 2020 to more than 1.8 million.31 
We also found broad support for the role the internet 
can play in our lives across groups of people with 
very different attitudes to the politics of the internet. 
In our Polis consultation, we found two strongly 
divided groups amongst our participants.32
Group B - the interventionists - has a desire for 
much stronger regulation of the internet, and strict 
restrictions on a wide variety of harmful content 
online. They want little tolerance of bad behaviour 
or content online, and are very supportive of 
government intervention.
Group A - the government sceptics - wants to 
preserve freedoms online, both intrinsically and to 
prevent bad regulation. This group felt the internet 
is a positive force in society, rarely felt anxious 
online, and didn’t feel that unpleasant behaviour 
stopped them doing what they wanted. They are 
generally against increasing government regulation 
or intervention – even where that intervention would 
promote internet access.
However, despite divisions about how the internet 
should be regulated and the role of the internet, 
we saw consensus that the internet was a positive 
force in their lives. Even across people with strongly 
divided political beliefs, there remains positivity and 
optimism about the role of the internet in our lives.  
Risks: The digital divide will become more 
important, face-to-face services are in 
jeopardy, and we need to improve the 
quality of online debate.
There are serious and substantial risks from this 
unstoppable shift to living more online.
The first risk is to those left outside these new 
systems. A significant portion of the population are 
limited in their internet use or do not use it at all: 
9 million people in the UK can’t use the internet 
without help and 7 million people have no access to 
the internet at home.33 The disparate experiences 
of people during Covid-19 proved that digitisation 
does not affect everyone equally. Those who feel less 
confident online, or lack digital skills; who cannot 
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afford devices to get online, or struggle to afford 
continuous payments for internet access; those who 
live in rural areas with poor broadband access; those 
whose jobs do not allow them to work remotely; 
those who are disproportionately targeted by online 
harms from abuse to scams - these are the people 
who risk being left behind or left out by a new 
digitised world. 
Our research shows the public is alive to this fear 
and willing to back efforts to get more people 
online. In our nationally representative poll, 54% of 
people said they would support the government 
spending more money on digital infrastructure such 
as broadband, with just 10% opposing. 60% said 
they would support the government spending more 
money on helping people unable to use the internet 
to get online, with just 8% opposing.34 
Then there’s the impact on face-to-face services, 
which many of the participants in Renew Normal 
have raised fears about. Though people welcome 
their new choices and freedoms, they don’t want 
online life to become the only way of doing 
things. Concerns abound that businesses will 
move to online-only working, which for some 
people negatively affects their mental health 
and productivity; that the convenience for some 
34 Demos polling, November 2020.
35 Demos polling, November 2020.
of being able to access essential services online 
will overshadow the need of others for offline 
options; that online retail will leave the high street 
devastated.
75% of people told us they would prefer essential 
services (such as in education, banking, and 
healthcare) to be accessible both online and offline 
after the pandemic, even if it is more expensive.35 
This is easier said than done: the costs of digital 
transformation are substantial, and the costs of 
retaining face-to-face services in both public and 
private sector become unviable once customer 
numbers fall below a critical mass. It is vital that we 
think creatively about ways to navigate this challenge 
and meet public expectations.
And finally there are risks from the often toxic nature 
of our online environment, from misinformation to 
the impact of social media on mental health. The 
pandemic has brought into sharp relief that public 
health is affected by what happens online as well 
as off: from conspiracy theories online leading 
people to attack 5G towers, to health misinformation 
endangering particularly vulnerable people. In 
our poll, though people appreciated the new 
connections tech had afforded them, 48% said that 
the impact of social media and time spent online on 
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Internet access should be 
treated and regulated as a 
vital service, in a similar way 
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If people treated online spaces more 
like they treat offline spaces, the 
Internet would be better
Education for non IT literate people 
should be provided free of charge
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their life and happiness had not changed during the 
pandemic.36 By contrast, just 17% said it had made it 
better, while 25% said it had made it worse. 
This risk can, however, be turned into an opportunity 
to find a new model for the internet. Demos’ Good 
Web Project is exploring the rules and protocols that 
should underpin a liberal web, and will continue to 
put forward policy proposals that will help us meet 
the challenge of building healthy, well-regulated 
online spaces.
Policy proposals: Digital inclusion and 
infrastructure investment, a new model for 
face-to-face services, and building a better 
internet 
It is time for an ‘Everybody In’ approach to digital, 
focused on both infrastructure and skills. The 
government should:
• Recognise internet access as an essential need, 
invest significantly in digital infrastructure in 
less well-connected areas, and provide help to 
those who are unable to afford sufficient internet 
connection. We support the proposal of a 
Minimum Digital Living Standard.37
• Invest in upskilling people who are currently 
digitally excluded through lack of skills, focusing on 
supporting existing local authority or community 
organisations who are providing these services.38 
We need to redesign face-to-face services - in the 
public and private sector - developing a strategy 
alongside efforts to reinvent our urban spaces.
• Savings made by essential services moving online 
should be invested back into targeting offline 
services at the particular groups who most require 
them.
• National and local government should collaborate 
on creating innovative ‘front of house’ models 
for the full range of public services, including 
collaborating with the private sector.
And we need to build a better internet. Policy 
interventions should include:
• A duty of care on platforms should include 
requirements on platforms to empower users 
to report and reduce abuse online, including 
providing more transparent reporting tools and 
processes for redress. 
36 Demos polling, September 2020.
37 Carnegie UK Trust. Learning from lockdown: 12 steps to eliminate digital exclusion. 2020. Available at https://d1ssu070pg2v9i.cloudfront.
net/pex/carnegie_uk_trust/2020/10/14161948/Carnegie-Learning-from-lockdown-Report-FINAL.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
38 Good Things Foundation. Coronavirus and Digital Inclusion. 2020. Available at https://www.goodthingsfoundation.org/coronavirus-and-
digital-inclusion [accessed 19/2/2021]
39 Foxglove. Open letter from content moderators re: pandemic. 2020. Available at  https://www.foxglove.org.uk/news/open-letter-from-
content-moderators-re-pandemic [accessed 23/02/2021]
40 Demos polling, September 2020.
41 Demos polling, September 2020.
42 Duffy, B. Life under lockdown: coronavirus in the UK. KCL: The Policy Institute, 2020. Available at https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/
assets/coronavirus-in-the-uk.pdf [accessed 13/08/2020]
• An independent regulator should require data 
access from social media platforms, so that the 
incidence of harmful content and the effectiveness 
of reporting, moderation and curation systems 
can be assessed by third-parties outside of the 
platforms themselves. 
• Tech platforms should invest in their human 
moderators, offering increased professional 
psychological care and enabling greater home 
working.39
COMMUNITIES AND VOLUNTEERING
Insights: Community connection and 
relationships were the silver lining in 
the pandemic. They must be preserved 
and enhanced as part of the recovery 
settlement.
The pandemic was a hugely divisive experience. 
On every issue we researched, from finance to 
friendships, healthcare to hunger - some people’s 
lives got better, and others got worse. But on 
average: things got worse. On almost every topic 
more people said life had got harder, with only 
two exceptions: connection to community, and 
connection to family.
While mutual aid groups were established in streets 
and estates across the country, and community 
organisations mobilised to look after millions 
of vulnerable people, it is clear that community 
organising was not a universal experience. And yet, 
where it did happen, it was one of the few sources 
of hope and optimism in an extraordinary year. 31% 
of people told us they felt more connected to their 
local community and 39% reported being more 
connected to friends and family.40 A further 6% of 
adults - more than 3 million people - who didn’t 
have anyone they could turn to for help in their 
neighbourhood, now feel that they do.41
Polling from King’s College London in April 2020 
found 60% had offered help to others while a further 
47% had received help from others.42 Similarly, ONS 
data suggests that 66% of people thought that 
if they needed help, then other local community 
members would support them during the pandemic. 
And people want this to continue. In one of our 
polls, 42% of respondents said that they were “very 
likely” or “fairly likely” to volunteer for the NHS or 
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public service in the future.43 Nearly three quarters 
of us believe that volunteers playing a greater role in 
public services would be good for society, and good 
for public services.
So any strategy for renewal and repair must build 
on this widely-shared public ambition for more 
community, more collaboration and more mutual aid. 
Risks: Social capital is unequally distributed, 
so we could see widening inequality. We 
could try to micromanage from the state 
and mess things up. And we could expect 
too much from voluntary services.
We’ve identified three key risks associated with using 
a programme of community investment to bring the 
country back together: inequality in social capital, 
the challenge of using the state to mobilise non-state 
actors, and the risk that volunteerism is seen as a way 
of covering up underinvestment in public services. It 
is the last of these that could drive political division, 
as the results of our Polis consultation show.
First, inequality. Covid-19 has exposed the way in 
which ‘left behind’ areas of Britain are often lacking 
in social capital and social infrastructure, as well as 
economically disadvantaged. The Carnegie UK Trust 
found that voluntary mutual aid activity was 60% 
lower in ‘left behind’ neighbourhoods.44 Deprived 
areas with low levels of social infrastructure received 
less than half the Covid-19 related funding per head 
than other equally deprived communities with a 
stronger social infrastructure.45
Community business and charitable organisations 
have often formed the anchor points for mutual aid 
activities: where they do not exist, individuals have 
often struggled to pull together sufficient critical 
mass to meet needs. Areas that lacked infrastructure 
were unable to apply for funding, or when they did, 
were often unsuccessful. A significant proportion of 
us still do not know the names and contact details of 
people in our neighbourhood (45%) - but it’s 61% of 
those in social grade A who do, and only 36% those 
in social grade D.46 People in group A were also 
twice as likely as the average person to have made 
new connections during lockdown.
43 Demos polling, September 2020.
44 Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion. Communities at risk: the early impact of Covid-19 on ‘left behind’ neighbourhoods. Local Trust. 
2020. Available at: https://www.appg-leftbehindneighbourhoods.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Communities-at-risk-the-early-impact-of-
COVID-19-on-left-behind-neighbourhoods.pdf
45 Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion. Communities at risk: the early impact of Covid-19 on ‘left behind’ neighbourhoods. Local Trust. 
2020. Available at: https://www.appg-leftbehindneighbourhoods.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Communities-at-risk-the-early-impact-of-
COVID-19-on-left-behind-neighbourhoods.pdf
46 Demos polling, September 2020. Social grades as defined by the Market Research Society here: https://www.mrs.org.uk/pdf/
Definitions%20used%20in%20Social%20Grading%20based%20on%20OG7.pdf
47 Lim, C. and Laurence, J. (2015) Doing good when times are bad: volunteering behaviour in economic hard times. The British Journal of 
Sociology, 2015. Available at https://europepmc.org/article/MED/25925802 [accessed 19/2/2021]
48 Lim, C. and Laurence, J. (2015) Doing good when times are bad: volunteering behaviour in economic hard times. The British Journal of 
Sociology, 2015. Available at https://europepmc.org/article/MED/25925802 [accessed 19/2/2021]
49 Demos Polis, October 2020.
And this could get worse. Research exploring the 
impact of the 2008-9 recession on volunteering 
behaviours suggests the decline in volunteering 
has been more pronounced in regions of high 
unemployment, and in socially and economically 
disadvantaged communities.47 Poorer communities 
will be most adversely affected by the oncoming 
recession, making them vulnerable to a further 
reduction in social action.48 By contrast, richer areas 
are likely to benefit from an increase in professional 
home workers, who are more likely to have time 
for volunteering and community involvement. We 
could see a widening gap in terms of community 
engagement: another confirmation that the levelling 
up agenda addressed above needs to focus on 
social as well as economic capital.
The greatest political risk associated with a 
movement to increase volunteering and improve 
community connection is if this is seen as a way to 
cover up for cuts. While there is huge enthusiasm 
for mutual aid groups to continue, and for more 
volunteers to be involved in public service, this has 
to supplement core funding and essential services. 
This is confirmed by the results of our Polis 
consultation. It identified two groups: community 
activists (Group B) and community naturalists (Group 
A).49 Both are keen on greater community activity 
and collaboration after the pandemic - the divide 
is about whether to generate this proactively or to 
focus on organic growth. The activists are keener 
on government investment, interfaith outreach, and 
even forgoing work to volunteer. The naturalists are 
more sceptical about those kinds of intervention. 
But on both sides there is a strong conviction that 
voluntarism should supplement essential public 
services, not replace them.
Protection of, and investment in, public services 
will help ensure that a programme of community 
development does not become a political dividing 
line, but a source of connection and optimism for the 
nation.
Finally, there is the intrinsic challenge of using 
government to prompt community-building 
- perhaps one of the reasons the community 
naturalists are wary of government funding. Most 
efforts by the national government to mobilise the 
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hyper-local will struggle. National government is 
too remote and bureaucratic to be able to initiate 
or grow community networks and neighbourhood 
organisations, which have to be largely self-
organised to last. So it should not try. Instead, we 
need to look at the barriers and challenges that hold 
back community development, and focus efforts on 
removing them: including access to buildings, digital 
infrastructure, funding, and opportunities to take 
control over programmes or places.
Policy proposals: Put communities 
in the driving seat of rebuilding and 
recovery: give them funding, assets and 
opportunities to mobilise around.
We need to stop thinking of community as ‘nice to 
have’ and start putting it at the heart of our recovery 
and renewal planning. Community action isn’t a 
bolt-on to make people feel good: almost every 
element of government activity should consider how 
to mobilise community action and volunteering, as a 
way of improving outcomes and effectiveness.
In other words, if - as we recommend later - we 
decide to massively expand urban green spaces, 
or launch a plan to fight obesity and promote 
healthy eating, we should work out how to make 
communities and local relationships a core part of 
the solution. 
Communities should be empowered to:
• Lead the process of reimagining their own urban, 
suburban, and rural spaces that are affected by 
economic and technological change. From high 
streets to new parkland: communities should be 
leading on design, and be a major part of delivery.
• This should be funded by a mix of grants, asset 
transfers, and support for community businesses.
• Communities - who have been such a vital part of 
the response to food poverty - should be a major 
part of the National Food Strategy.
Communities have shown they are one of the most 
effective elements of disaster and emergency relief. 
All our resilience planning should include efforts to 
build up social capital and community infrastructure 
that can be flexibly deployed at times of crisis:
• We should create a new measure of social capital, 
and its geographic distribution, to inform policy 
making.
• The government’s levelling up agenda should aim 
to reduce inequality of social capital - as well as 
economic capital.
It is vital that efforts to increase volunteering and 
voluntarism are focused on community building 
and supplementary support. A major programme 
of community development must not become a 
political dividing line, but a source of connection 
and optimism for the nation. In a recently published 
POLIS: COMMUNITIES AND VOLUNTEERING
Would like to 
see mutual aid 
groups remain 
post-pandemic
Strongly believe it 
would be dangerous 
for essential public 
services to rely on 
volunteers
More willing to 
volunteer even if that 
means foregoing 
working hours
Keen to incorporate 
different ethnicities and 
faiths in community 
outreach strategies
Want to see increased 
government expenditure 
within communities
Strongly opposed to 
increasing government 
funding for community-led 
services
See little importance in 
incorporating different 
ethnicities and faiths in 
community outreach 
strategies
Less willing to 
forego work hours 
to volunteer
GROUP A GROUP B
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paper on the impact of the pandemic on the charity 
sector, Demos noted that 57% of charities with 
public sector contracts said they were subsidising 
these contracts with other resources, including public 
fundraising.50 
• Government should mitigate these risks by 
ensuring public service funding keeps up with 
demand. It should also:
• Introduce new protections to ensure charities are 
not subsidising core NHS or other services.
• Guarantee statutory funding for hospices.
ACCESS TO GREEN SPACE
Insights: One of the biggest changes, 
and strongest areas of consensus, is the 
increased value we put on access to green 
space.
During the pandemic, the unprecedented restrictions 
on our movement made us more aware of the green 
spaces and nature around us. They became our main 
spot for meeting with people, for exercising and 
clearing our mind. So it is no surprise that access to 
green space topped our poll of the issues people 
thought had become more important as a result of 
the pandemic.51
This isn’t just a summer phenomenon: our most 
recent poll in November showed that 74% support 
the government and councils spending money on 
more and better maintained green spaces, such as 
parks. 8 in 10 older people support this statement. 
A further 28% of people strongly support spending 
money on more and better maintained green spaces. 
Investing in green space is also a way of building up 
our mental, physical and environmental resilience. 
Evidence shows that people spending time in 
nature reported consistently higher levels of both 
health and wellbeing than those who reported no 
exposure.52 Prior to this pandemic, research from 
Natural England suggested that if everyone in 
England had equal access to good green space, the 
NHS could save over £2 billion a year in treatment 
costs.53 They have an environmental benefit as well, 
such as improving air quality, reducing the possibility 
of flooding or providing cooling or shading.54
50 Wood, C. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the charitable sector, and its prospects for recovery. Demos, 2021. Available at https://
demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Covid-19-impact-on-the-charitable-sector.pdf [accessed 24/02/2021]
51 Demos polling, September 2020.
52 White, M. et al. Spending at least 120 minutes a week in nature is associated with good health and wellbeing. Nature, 2019. Available at 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-019-44097-3 [accessed 19/2/2021]
53 Natural England. An estimate of the value and cost effectiveness of the expanded Walking the Way to Health Initiative scheme 2009 
(TIN055). 2009. Available at http://publications.naturalengland.org.uk/publication/35009 [accessed 19/2/2021]
54 Kingsley, M. and EcoHealth Ontario. Commentary Climate change, health and green space co-benefits. Health Promotion and Chronic 
Disease Prevention in Canada: Research, Policy and Practice, 2019. Available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6553580/ 
[accessed 19/2/2021]
55 Friends of the Earth. England’s green space gap. 2020. Available at https://policy.friendsoftheearth.uk/sites/files/policy/
documents/2020-09/Green_space_gap_full_report_0.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
56 Friends of the Earth. England’s green space gap. 2020. Available at https://policy.friendsoftheearth.uk/sites/files/policy/
documents/2020-09/Green_space_gap_full_report_0.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
57 Demos Polis, October/November 2020.
58 Demos Polis, October/November 2020.
Reclaiming land and streetspace for community-run 
parks, in particular, could help build social capital 
and community connection, while increasing access 
to green space as part of a public health strategy. 
Risks: We could see continued inequality 
in access to green space, and a backlash 
if transport change is pushed through too 
aggressively.
Like so many of the issues raised by Covid-19, access 
to green space reminds us of the powerful impact 
of inequality, which goes far beyond simply income. 
A study by Friends of the Earth conducted in 2020 
found that 11.6 million people in England live in the 
1,257 neighbourhoods which are the most deprived 
of green space.55 Ethnic minorities are particularly 
affected: 42% of BAME people live in England’s 
most green space-deprived neighbourhoods.56 Now 
we understand the links between green space and 
wellbeing, it’s clear that any failure to improve access 
will have a continuing effect on inequality in the long 
term.
There is also a real need to decarbonise transport 
and improve public health. Increased investment in 
safe walking and cycling routes will be an important 
part of urban transformation. With more people 
working remotely, it may be possible to encourage 
a substantial shift away from motor vehicles and 
toward community living. There is some enthusiasm 
for this: by a margin of two-to-one the public 
support the government and councils setting 
aside more areas in towns and cities where road 
traffic is banned, even if it makes it more difficult 
or expensive to travel by car (44% support vs. 22% 
oppose).57
However, rushed or poorly-planned efforts to reduce 
car usage, for example by blocking side streets, can 
be extremely divisive. Turning roads into cycling or 
walking routes or green spaces was one of the most 
divisive issues in our Polis. Around half of Group A, 
moderate greeners (47%) think cyclists are given too 
much preference over drivers as things stand. On the 
other hand, more than 9 in 10 in Group B, absolute 
greeners (95%) say we should make it easier and 
safer for people to cycle in town and city centres.58 
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We need a consultative approach to build consensus 
for urban redesign, not piecemeal transport 
interventions that just cause a backlash.
Policy proposals: A massive investment in 
new community and civic parkland should 
be a core element of the post-Covid 
settlement.
We already know - from the research cited above and 
elsewhere - that we are going to need to redesign 
our physical infrastructure to respond to the impacts 
of Covid-19. At the same time, this is an opportunity 
to update our social and economic geography to 
keep pace with technological change. At the top of 
the agenda for this physical transformation should 
be improved access to green space, in particular for 
those communities who have the least. 
Local and national government should:
• Create a new parks fund to support the reclaiming 
of disused urban land for green space - including 
both small community parks and strategic green 
space in major centres, to drive social and 
economic regeneration.
• Set a goal that no-one should live more than five 
minutes away from green space, and that every 
urban area should have at least one landmark park.
This is also an opportunity for community 
development and everyday democracy. As 
Covid-19 recedes, we can find new purpose for 
neighbourhood groups and community organisations 
in designing and managing new or existing green 
spaces. Local and national government should:
• Give more power to people in local decision 
making about future green space. 
• Encourage public engagement in managing green 
spaces on an ongoing basis.
• Ensure full community consultation over 
transport redesign proposals - like Low Transport 
Neighbourhoods - to increase walking and cycling. 
INEQUALITY
Insights: Attitudes have changed 
substantially, because the pandemic has 
made inequality more visible and has drawn 
attention to the way inequality harms us all.
One of the greatest shifts in public opinion during 
this crisis has been on questions of social and 
economic inequality. As outlined above, there 
is strong evidence of a change in attitudes, with 
particular enthusiasm for ‘levelling up’ the poorest 
groups and the lowest paid, as well as equalising 
access to opportunity, good health, and wellbeing 
essentials like green space and decent food.
POLIS: GREEN SPACE
Would prefer to 
live near green 
spaces, even it if 
means living further 
away from shops, 
entertainment and 
public services
Strongly agree that 
easily accessible green 
spaces are essential to 
good mental health
Strongly support 
government aiming for 
everyone to have a 
green space within a 5 
minute walk from home
Willing to pay more 
council tax, if it means 
more accessible local 
green spaces
Very strongly support 
making it easier and safer 
for people to cycle in town 
and city centres
Strongly oppose there 
being more areas where 
driving is banned
Strongly oppose turning 
sections of road in their local 
area into green space, if it 
makes driving more difficult
Believe cyclists are given 
too much preference 
over drivers, as things 
stand
GROUP A GROUP B
Oppose the 
majority of the 
transport budget 
being spent on 
facilities for motor 
vehicles
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As a society, we have seen the extent of inequality 
through this crisis. Through campaigns and 
discussions about food, access to green space, and 
health inequalities, it has become increasingly clear 
that inequality is about more than income. Opinium 
reported that 39% believe that inequality is worse in 
Britain than they realised pre-pandemic.59 
And the pandemic has worsened inequality on any 
number of measures. Our research showed that a 
huge range of behaviours and experiences during 
lockdown were correlated with your socio-economic 
status, from whether you ate well, bonded with your 
neighbours, or managed to teach your children at 
home. In short: the poorer you were before this 
crisis, the more likely you were to struggle during it. 
Racial disparities in health outcomes are not new, 
but they have become uniquely high-profile during 
the pandemic. The combination of the Black Lives 
Matter movement and the debate about the 
disproportionate health impact of Covid-19 on 
some ethnic minorities has created a wider public 
conversation about structural inequalities, specifically 
around race, that has the potential to prompt 
widespread change.
Our results demonstrate that a sizable proportion 
of respondents felt people were more aware of 
age, race, and economic inequality within the UK 
since the pandemic began.60 And, crucially, they are 
also supportive of stronger efforts to tackle these 
three forms of inequality than we made prior to the 
pandemic: 
1. On age inequality: 47% felt that people were 
more aware of age inequality; 53% favoured 
taking stronger action to tackle it.
2. On economic inequality: 56% felt people were 
more aware; 57% supporting tougher action.
3. On racial inequality, 51% felt people were more 
aware; 49% supporting tougher action.
Finally, and vitally, there is increasing evidence 
that the public is willing to accept the trade-offs 
associated with doing more to tackle inequality. As 
set out above, polling we conducted in November 
found very strong support for better pay and 
conditions for the low paid, even if this leads to 
downsides like higher prices or tax rises.
Other forms of investment to level up - on wellbeing, 
opportunity, or race inequality - also command 
substantial public support. Government expenditure 
59 Compassion in Politics. Over one in three adults admit inequality in Britain is worse than they thought pre-Covid. 2020. Available at https://
www.compassioninpolitics.com/inequalityworse [accessed 7/12/2020]
60 Demos polling, November 2020.
61 Demos polling, November 2020.
62 Wells, A. ‘Unavoidable cuts’? YouGov, 2010. Available at https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2010/10/19/unavoidable-cuts-
story [accessed 7/12/2020]
63 Glover, B. and Seaford, C. A People’s Budget: How the Public Would Raise Taxes. Demos, 2020. Available at https://demos.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/A-Peoples-Budget-Sept-2020-v5.pdf [accessed 23/02/2021]
64 British Heart Foundation. What factors put you at risk from coronavirus?. 2020. Available at https://www.bhf.org.uk/informationsupport/
heart-matters-magazine/news/coronavirus-and-your-health/what-makes-you-at-risk-from-coronavirus [accessed 23/02/2021]
expanded enormously during the pandemic in order 
to provide support to people, businesses, and public 
services at a time of crisis. Only a small minority 
(15%) want spending to be reduced, while 26% say 
the government should maintain spending and 47% 
say the government should spend more.61 This is in 
marked contrast to public attitudes in 2010, where 
60% of voters viewed spending cuts as unavoidable 
for the Coalition government.62 
Other work by Demos suggests the public, on 
balance, supports increasing taxation in order to pay 
for this spending, though the consensus is that those 
tax rises would be best timed once the economy has 
recovered more fully.63 
Finally, it’s clear that the pandemic has exposed the 
effects on inequality, as well as its extent. Yes: the 
pandemic has worsened inequality. But inequality 
also worsened the pandemic.
Individual and family-level financial fragility
Huge numbers of people and families had no savings 
or sick pay to fall back on as the pandemic began. 
This made our whole economic system more fragile 
and increased the call on the state for emergency 
aid. We have seen sharp differences between the 
rich and poor in terms of not just mortality, but 
wellbeing, safety, hunger and loss of income. That 
unequal impact clearly has not just harmed those 
directly affected. 
The pandemic is harder to suppress when some 
people cannot afford to isolate; have such 
inadequate homes that they cannot bear to stay 
indoors or don’t have homes at all; cannot afford 
equipment to educate their children at home; or 
have so little power at work that they can be forced 
by unscrupulous employers into Covid-insecure 
workplaces. 
And the economy will recover more slowly for all 
of us because of the long tail of scarring impacts: 
businesses that were too fragile to survive, jobs that 
have been lost and people who accrued debts they 
can’t afford to repay. 
Public health and wellbeing
The UK has comparatively high levels of obesity, 
diabetes and hypertension, all of which are risk 
factors for severe disease with a Covid-19 infection.64 
Ministers have now accepted that the overall health 
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of the population contributed to our systemic 
vulnerability to this pandemic and increased the 
number of deaths and ICU cases. 
More broadly, it is likely that high levels of anxiety 
and depression in wider society made us less 
resilient to the impacts of lockdown on our mental 
health and wellbeing. The UK has wide disparities in 
access to green space and a significant problem with 
food and fuel poverty - the latter a significant factor 
during the winter lockdown period. All these will 
have worsened the impact of the pandemic and the 
resulting lockdowns on the health and wellbeing of 
the population as a whole.
Social capital
The community response to Covid-19 has, as we saw 
above, been one of the most reassuring beacons 
of light during this difficult year. And yet we have 
also seen that there remain substantial proportions 
of the population who know almost no-one in their 
neighbourhood, and that loneliness increased 
for millions. Most worrying of all, there are huge 
gaps and disparities in social capital across the UK. 
Mapped comprehensively by Onward as part of their 
State of Social Fabric inquiry, it is clear that - with 
some notable exceptions - social capital is thinner in 
places of poverty and disadvantage.65 
Risks: This doesn’t mean the argument is 
settled.
There has been a change in opinion about inequality, 
but that doesn’t mean there is easy consensus about 
precisely what to do about it. In some ways, public 
concern about inequality is not new: the 2019 British 
Social Attitudes Survey reported that 78% think the 
gap between high and low incomes is too wide. And 
yet, this long-standing consensus has not prompted 
policies that have reduced inequality.
There is slightly less consensus, too, around efforts 
to reduce inequality between groups - even where 
there is clear evidence, from this pandemic and 
elsewhere, that some groups experience structural 
disadvantage. 37% of respondents to our poll 
believe we should not take further action to reduce 
racial inequality; 38% said we should not take further 
action to reduce age inequality.66 
65 Tanner, W. et al. The State of our Social Fabric: Measuring the changing nature of community over time and geography. Onward, 2020. 
Available at https://www.ukonward.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-State-of-our-Social-Fabric.pdf [accessed 23/02/2021]
66 Demos polling, November 2020.
The best way to build consensus here, and avoid 
divisive narratives, is to focus on the concept of 
levelling up. Levelling up brings together the idea of 
improving outcomes for the worst off with the idea of 
maintaining aspiration for everyone. Renew Normal’s 
work - and other research by Demos, notably on the 
tax system - suggests this is the best way to build 
consensus. There is far less enthusiasm for tackling 
inequality if it involves bringing down people at the 
top, than if it is focused on levelling up those at the 
bottom.
Policy proposals: Level up people, not 
just places, and think about wellbeing and 
community as well as incomes.
The levelling up agenda needs a new scope. Initially 
the agenda has been focused on the idea of bringing 
jobs and opportunity - often through public transport 
investment - to left behind places. Now, after 
Covid-19, levelling up needs to become an agenda 
to bring wellbeing and prosperity to a far wider 
range of left behind people and places, covering 
social as well as economic policy.
Levelling up should include:
• Renewed efforts to tackle low pay and improve the 
welfare safety net (as set out above).
• A major investment in building social capital in left-
behind areas, through practical community projects 
(as set out above).
• Huge expansion in access to green space, 
especially in left-behind areas, as part of a 
wellbeing strategy to reduce happiness inequality.
• A national programme to get Britain healthy, with 
targets to substantially reduce the gap between 
rich and poor on obesity, activity levels and 
smoking.
• Renewed commitments to level up opportunity, 






This section of the report 
seeks to identify the cross-
cutting lessons and insights 
from the Renew Normal 
process.
This pandemic has had such a vast, far-reaching, 
and complex impact on our lives and the policy 
agenda, that it is almost impossible to keep anything 
in a silo. The whole pandemic response was an 
unparalleled spillover from health policy to the 
economy. But everywhere you look, there is a web 
of interconnection. Community policy is linked to 
the green space agenda, which is linked to reducing 
obesity, which is linked to inequality. Remote working 
affects not just the economy of towns and cities, but 
the scale of volunteering, and patterns of exercise.
The five lessons are set out below. They can be 
used as a framework against which to test any policy 
proposal for post-Covid recovery. If we ensure our 
policy response is fully informed by these lessons, 
we can build a coherent recovery plan: one that sows 
consensus instead of greater division and inequality.
1. There’s consensus for change. Don’t pretend 
this didn’t happen.
2. Level up people, not just places.
3. Community makes us stronger, not just happier.
4. Remote working and online shopping aren’t 
going away: we need to adapt.
5. We need to redesign the places where we live 
and work.
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LESSON 1: THERE’S CONSENSUS FOR 
CHANGE. DON’T PRETEND THIS DIDN’T 
HAPPEN
Minds and expectations have changed, in many 
cases radically. This may not be a paradigm shift: 
there is little evidence to suggest the pandemic 
will be the end of capitalism, or that a libertarian 
backlash against lockdown will lead to the 
dismantling of the state. But there is ample evidence 
that it would be a mistake to minimise the impact 
of this period of our history on our ambitions, 
expectations or behaviours in the years to come.
In our first survey, about 7,000 of the 11,000 
respondents told us they had changed their mind 
about or learned something as a result of the 
pandemic, with examples as diverse as discovering 
their neighbours were wonderful, to deciding to 
stop work; from seeing the importance of immigrant 
workers in our care system, to losing faith in other 
people when seeing them breaking lockdown 
restrictions. 
In November, we conducted a nationally 
representative poll to identify whether this shift in 
opinion was still prevalent and to what extent across 
the population as a whole. We asked people to tell 
us if they had changed their mind or reinforced their 
views on a number of topics: what’s important in 
their life, what’s important in society, how we should 
run the economy, and how we should run public 
services.
On all domains, people were about twice as likely - 
or more - to have reinforced their views than to have 
changed their minds. But that doesn’t mean we can 
ignore the political ramifications. First, people who 
have doubled-down on their beliefs as a result of 
this pandemic may be more likely to change their 
actions or political choices because of the new-found 
strength of their opinions. They could be mobilised 
as activists or make different choices about how they 
spend their work or leisure time.
Secondly, it’s vital to recognise that it is genuinely 
unusual for 20-24% of the population to change their 
minds about big issues in so short a period. Shifts 
in public opinion about matters like homosexuality, 
climate change and the welfare state tend to be 
largely a result of generational changes, as those on 
one side of the debate die and are replaced by a 
generation with different views. We have seen what 
many consider a big change in public opinion about 
climate change over the last six years: Ipsos Mori 
polling found 85% were concerned about climate 



























change in 2019, compared to just 60% in 2013.67 But 
that’s a 25 percentage point change over six years, 
not six months.
The clearest, overarching insight from Renew Normal 
is this: attempts to return the United Kingdom to 
the way things were will fail, because this is not what 
the public want or what business will invest in. While 
overall the pandemic has had a negative impact on 
the public’s health and wellbeing, and will continue 
to have serious consequences for our economy, it 
has also caused changes in the way we live our lives, 
and what we want from our society, that the public 
wants to maintain. 
When thinking about the future, it is vital for all our 
leaders to understand the fundamental shifts that 
have occurred. The future we expected in January 
2020 is not going to happen. We need to start 
planning for the future we now want.
LESSON 2: LEVEL UP PEOPLE, NOT JUST 
PLACES
The question of inequality and levelling up recurred 
across almost every consultation or discussion we 
conducted. We found worries about low pay and the 
safety net; concern about food poverty; evidence of 
a big gap between rich and poor on almost every 
outcome measure from healthy eating to happiness. 
The things people learned to value - like community 
connection and green space - are less available 
to those in poorer areas, with disabled and ethnic 
minority groups often even less able to access them. 
There is a real opportunity after this crisis to shift 
the focus about what the government means by 
levelling up. The agenda to narrow the gap between 
poorer, northern towns and richer places in the South 
East remains important. But as we emerge from the 
crisis, it’s clear we need a much more comprehensive 
approach, if we are to make Britain stronger and 
more resilient.
That comprehensive approach should include:
• Levelling up wellbeing - through investment in 
green space and more flexible working.
• Levelling up social capital - through a community 
development programme and support for 
volunteering.
• Levelling up health - with a focus on poverty 
reduction, obesity, and healthcare access.
67 Skinner, G. Concern about climate change reaches record levels with half now ‘very concerned’. Ipsos MORI, 2019. Available at https://
www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/concern-about-climate-change-reaches-record-levels-half-now-very-concerned [accessed 7/12/2020]
68 Taylor, M. and Wilson, M. Locally Rooted: The place of community organising in times of crisis. Community Organisers, 2020. Available at 
https://www.corganisers.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Locally_Rooted-the_place_of_co_in_times_of_crisis.pdf [accessed 9/2/2021]
• Levelling up for left behind workers - with a higher 
minimum wage, strengthened employment rights 
and a stronger welfare safety net.
• Levelling up for left behind groups - fulfilling 
commitments on racial equality and support for 
disabled people.
• Levelling up digital access - with a combination of 
infrastructure and skills investment.
LESSON 3: COMMUNITY MAKES US 
STRONGER, NOT JUST HAPPIER
The pandemic has proved beyond all doubt that 
community networks are a vital component of 
national resilience. National shielding support 
schemes, national test and trace, and national 
volunteering programmes were regularly out-
performed by their local counterparts. And, as 
we explored in the previous section, hyper-local 
community organising delivered not just direct aid, 
but a national morale boost, too.
Community business and charitable organisations 
have often formed the anchor points for mutual 
aid activities: where they do not exist, individuals 
have often struggled to pull together sufficient 
critical mass to meet needs. Areas that lacked social 
infrastructure were unable to apply for funding, or 
when they did, were often unsuccessful. 
This is because community organisations contribute 
both social capital - often built up over years or 
decades - and organisational agility. Localised efforts 
are often the most receptive to the continuously 
changing nature of emergencies, because they 
remove the usual bureaucratic measures and can
mobilise people to meet need incredibly quickly. 
What makes their work uniquely successful boils 
down to the connections and trust they have built up 
over the years.68
And yet, we have also seen that there remain 
substantial proportions of the population who know 
almost no-one in their neighbourhood, and that 
loneliness increased for millions. Gaps and disparities 
in social capital contribute to systemic fragility, 
increasing the demands on the state to support 
individuals where neighbours and communities had 
not organised to do so. There is therefore a benefit 
to all of us if we fill these gaps in social capital, as 
part of the wider levelling up agenda.
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LESSON 4: REMOTE WORKING AND 
ONLINE SHOPPING ARE HERE TO STAY. 
WE NEED TO ADAPT
Over the last year, we’ve seen an unprecedented 
shift of our lives online. And while it hasn’t been 
perfect, and we can expect to see some return 
to offline working, socialising and shopping once 
restrictions are fully lifted, the simple reality is that 
we are not going back to how things were before.
People are broadly positive about the role 
technology has played in our lives. So there’s not 
much point trying to put the genie back in the bottle 
and persuade or incentivise people back to their 
offices, high streets, or commute. The policy agenda 
needs to urgently focus on three things:
• How to improve the quality of online experiences.
• How to adapt offline services so they can be 
affordably retained.
• How to adapt our physical spaces to the economic 
realities of the future - see Lesson 5 for more on 
this.
We need an ‘everybody in’ strategy for the digital 
world. A significant portion of the population are 
limited in their internet use or do not use it at all. 
9 million people in the UK can’t use the internet 
without help, while 7 million people have no 
access to the internet at home.69 These figures 
are not significant, but they also intersect with 
other inequalities: research by the Good Things 
Foundation and NHSX Digital finds that digital 
exclusion is a co-determinant of health, and as such, 
the digitally excluded risk health inequalities to a 
greater degree.70
Online spaces need more oversight as they become 
more important. Online spaces aren’t automatically 
good or bad: how they are designed, controlled 
and run determines to a large degree how people 
experience them. The pandemic has been a stark 
demonstration that online spaces, as they play a 
greater part in our lives, are even more in need of 
oversight and design in the public interest. 
Unregulated online spaces which are driven 
by commercial incentives are spaces where 
misinformation and abuse flourish: this poses serious 
threats to both individual wellbeing and public 
health. While the platforms have been much more 
aggressive and collaborative about misinformation, 
they have often been left playing catch-up. 
Forthcoming work on online harms needs to give 
regulators greater access to data, and incentivise 
69 Good Things Foundation. Digital Nation UK 2020. 2020. Available at https://www.goodthingsfoundation.org/sites/default/files/research-
publications/digital-nation-2020.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
70 Stone, E., Nuckley, P. and Shapiro, R. Digital Inclusion in Health and Care: Lessons learned from the NHS Widening Digital Participation 
Programme (2017-2020). Good Things Foundation, 2020. Available at https://www.goodthingsfoundation.org/sites/default/files/research-
publications/digital_inclusion_in_health_and_care-_lessons_learned_from_the_nhs_widening_digital_participation_programme_2017-2020__0.
pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
much greater investment in human moderation at 
scale. Our ongoing Good Web Project will continue 
to make recommendations about establishing a 
better set of rules and norms for a healthy internet.
We need to adapt offline options so that they can 
be retained. Our research showed real fear that 
offline options - to work, shop, or access public 
services - would disappear, and it would be people 
who are vulnerable, poor, or digitally excluded who 
would lose out. The public is clear that they would 
like offline options to be retained but - especially 
when it comes to shopping - this may be expensive 
or impossible. In public services, we argue that some 
of the savings from digital transformation should 
be recycled into face-to-face services for those who 
need them, as well as digital inclusion efforts. There 
are real opportunities, given the changes we are 
likely to see in office and high street property use, to 
redesign workspaces and public service ‘front offices’ 
to create hybrid spaces, where face-to-face support 
can be provided alongside digital infrastructure. Co-
working spaces in towns, shared between multiple 
employers, for example, may offer a half-way house 
between a long commute and home working. Many 
high streets could benefit from digital hubs where 
citizens can get face-to-face support accessing a 
range of online public services.
We need to reset the rules for remote working. 
From health and safety assessments to the costs of 
heating and broadband connections; from privacy 
and workplace surveillance to management training: 
there are a host of policy issues triggered by this 
step change in the numbers of people working from 
home. Through the Workshift Commission, Demos 
will explore these issues and make recommendations 
about how to ensure this change catalyses 
improvements in our working lives.
LESSON 5: WE NEED TO REDESIGN THE 
PLACES WHERE WE LIVE AND WORK
Our economic and social geography was under 
pressure long before the pandemic. Shopping was 
moving online and high streets were suffering. Cities 
were growing, pricing many people out, while towns 
were often dwindling, many with ageing populations. 
There were wide variations in access to green space 
and community buildings, which so often act as the 
foundations of community connection. Our public 
transport networks were overcrowded and in need 
of investment, and we needed major investment to 
create the infrastructure for moving towards electric 
vehicles. 
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Of course, the United Kingdom has always had 
an extraordinary range of public spaces, civic 
architecture and heritage assets, of which we are 
rightly proud. But pre-pandemic it was becoming 
increasingly clear that we needed to reshape 
the places where we live to increase civic space, 
adapt to climate change and technology, and to 
accommodate the changing needs of an ageing 
population. 
The pandemic accelerated many of these long term 
trends. This raises huge questions for the physical 
infrastructure of the country: from the viability of 
public transport networks to the imperative of 
insulating homes; from how to repurpose vacant 
office or retail buildings to how to create high quality 
public space where communities can come together.
Transition cannot mean that we wash our hands of 
the consequences of economic and social change: 
vacancies, derelict buildings, or impossibly expensive 
public transport. Of course, the market will support 
much of the switch from non-viable to viable uses 
of buildings. But the public is clear that they want 
the government to take a role in managing the 
consequences of change. In our research, there was 
widespread support for government playing a role in 
driving the transformation of city centres, to become 
primarily places for community, arts and leisure 
rather than businesses.71 
This is more than an obligation: it’s an opportunity.
Now is the moment for urban and rural planners 
alike to innovate. To test and explore how to build 
more liveable spaces, to support the connected 
communities the public is so keen to see emerge 
after this pandemic. This is an enormous opportunity 
for what Demos has called Everyday Democracy: 
mass participation in a consultation about what the 
future should look like for the spaces that matter 
most to each of us.
71 Demos Polis, October 2020.
We can mobilise discussion and debate, and help 
build a positive agenda for places that have - for too 
long - accepted the inevitability of decline.
And the plans we develop for those places can and 
must feed into the wider policy agenda for post-
Covid-19 renewal:
• More cycling and walking infrastructure could 
also be part of countering obesity and improving 
wellbeing.
• Insulating homes can be part of a plan to create 
new jobs, cut carbon emissions, and improve 
families’ financial resilience.
• Creating new, local co-working hubs for public 
servants on high streets could help create jobs 
and civic pride in left behind towns, as part of the 
levelling up agenda.
And as we set out above, at the top of the agenda 
for geographic change should be improved access 
to green space, in particular for those communities 
which have the least. Reclaiming land and 
streetspace for community-run parks, in particular, 
could help build social capital and community 
connection, while increasing access to green space 




“How do we prepare and give 
confidence to our teenagers 
today, who are facing climate 
change, the fracturing of 
international bonds and...
pandemics and climate 
change? How do we build 
resilience?”
– Renew Normal contributor, 
female, 70s, South East
In many ways this is a pick and mix report. Some 
readers may want to just home in on the topic that 
interests them the most - and they are welcome to 
do so. But our goal was to go one step beyond the 
individual findings and identify a policy narrative 
that had a chance of bringing a divided country back 
together. In this section we set out that vision.
Our core recommendation is this: we must put 
resilience at the heart of our post-Covid recovery 
programme. A national strategy to Build Back 
Stronger is the best way to bring a divided country 
back together, and drive both recovery and renewal.
First, we need to set out why division matters.
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DIVIDED WE GET STUCK
One of the great strengths of a democracy is our 
freedom to disagree with one another. Debate, 
dissent and division all have a vital role to play in 
a healthy, liberal society. And yet there needs to 
be something that holds us together, across these 
divides. Nations need a ‘demos’: a collective identity 
and a shared understanding that enables citizens to 
pool their sovereignty, and accept the rules imposed 
by the democratic will.
But we live in an era of fast and accelerating 
change which is putting more strain on democratic 
legitimacy than, arguably, has ever been seen before. 
Just a few examples:
We need fundamental transformation in our 
economy, from the way we generate energy to how 
we eat, if we are to prevent catastrophic climate 
change. And yet not one democratic government 
has a popular mandate for a detailed pathway to net 
zero carbon emissions.
Demographic change is sweeping the West. We 
have an ageing population, increasing demand on 
public services as the taxbase of working age people 
reduces. People ask for better public services, but 
are not necessarily willing to pay any more in tax.
Vast, global companies - which have grown far 
faster than any predecessors - are stretching our 
understanding of the relationship between state 
and corporation, and the social contract. Individual 
nation states - especially liberal democracies - seem 
feeble when acting against these global companies, 
and yet no-one has found a way to secure real 
democratic legitimacy for supra-national bodies like 
the European Union.
And yet, in the face of this change, the tools we 
have to build consensus – political institutions, social 
institutions, shared media content - are stagnant, 
fragmenting or collapsing. Access to information 
has in one sense been radically democratised by 
the internet, but has brought with it misinformation, 
radicalisation, outrage and a new platform for 
international information warfare, all of which sows 
division and discontent just at the moment when we 
need to take long term, collective decisions.
ALONG CAME COVID-19
In the early days of the pandemic, the country united 
- after years of political division and acrimony - in a 
common endeavour to beat the virus.
Yet much of that communal energy had dissipated 
within months and now, a year on, divisions are rawer 
than ever. Indeed, Covid-19 has actually accelerated 
divisions in many ways:
1. Accelerating change.  
Change is often pretty divisive, not least 
because you get winners and losers. In the UK 
- as in many other countries - we were already 
going through the digital transformation of 
public and consumer services and high street 
decline. Our labour market was changing as 
a result of both technology and globalisation. 
Health, care and pension costs were rising while 
tax revenues dwindled. Covid-19 accelerated all 
of these changes. We have seen:
• A huge acceleration of the shift to online 
services, working and shopping.
• The collapse of several major high street 
chains.
• Massive job losses, making the risk of 
labour market transition more painful.
• Hugely increased pressure for public service 
spending.
• A collapse in tax revenues.
2. New divisions 
As earlier waves of Renew Normal showed, 
Covid-19 also created a new pool of divisive 
problems. While there has broadly been 
consensus support for the majority of lockdown 
measures introduced throughout the last year, 
there have been visible arguments about a 
number of political issues including:
• Lockdown resentment: complaints from 
those who disagreed with the measures.
• Lockdown outrage: fury at those who 
refused to comply with the rules, in 
particular public figures who broke 
quarantine.
• Mask wars: the same pattern, with compliers 
reporting high levels of resentment towards 
non-compliers, and some non-compliers 
feeling outraged by the rules.
• Very visible economic winners and losers, 
including controversial large scale contracts 
for some private companies.
• Billions of pounds claimed fraudulently for 
Covid-19 support, while up to 3m weren’t 
eligible for any help from the schemes. 
• The debate about who should get priority 
access to vaccines, and the possibility of 
vaccine passports.
3. Widening inequality 
Inequality was already a divisive force of 
resentment and political anger before this 
crisis. It has got both worse and more salient. 
So we can expect more anger about inequality; 
without commitment from our politicians 




Renew Normal was designed to understand what 
kind of agenda would bring Britain back together 
after all this. Throughout this report, we have set out 
ways of navigating divisive policy issues and building 
consensus: tackling low pay for everyone, rather than 
just rewarding public sector workers, for example, or 
promoting flexible rather than just remote working. 
We want to apply that approach to the overarching 
narrative for post-Covid recovery.
Early on in the crisis, a movement was launched that 
said we should “Build Back Better.” This movement, 
backed by a range of political and civil society 
organisations, argued that we should be ambitious 
about recovery. Instead of just trying to patch things 
up, we should try to solve the problems Britain 
faced before the crisis. We absolutely support that 
approach. The Prime Minister welcomed it too, and 
at the start of this year launched a Build Back Better 
council, to “unlock investment, boost job creation 
and level up the whole of the UK.”72
The problem with ‘Build Back Better’ is that it doesn’t 
seek to define what ‘better’ means. It doesn’t identify 
what old problems we should solve, or even what 
qualified as a problem in the pre-Covid world. That 
is why, throughout Renew Normal, we aimed to 
move beyond the slogan and identify what it was 
that people want to change. We offered everyone 
the chance to have their say on what ‘better’ really 
means.
In December, the leading public health academic 
Michael Marmot put forward his proposals for post-
Covid reform under the banner of Build Back Fairer. 
This was another helpful contribution, but in our view 
it remains problematic. On the surface, fairness is 
something we can all agree on, but the word masks a 
fundamental values divide between those who think 
fairness means equity and those who think fairness 
means that actions should have consequences. This 
can create tension when it comes to choosing policy 
on welfare and job-seeking, or obesity and food 
choices. 
As the findings set out above show, we do not need 
to rely on a potentially divisive fairness debate to 
make the case for reducing inequality. There is a 
strong case that reducing inequality benefits all of 
us, by increasing the resilience of the country as 
a whole. The way to bring together all the policy 
recommendations set out here, in a way that builds 
consensus rather than division, is to focus on that 
resilience story. 
72 HM Government. Prime Minister and Chancellor launch new Business Council. 2020. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
prime-minister-and-chancellor-launch-new-business-council [accessed 24/02/2021]
73 Edwards, C. Resilient Nation. Demos, 2009. Available at https://www.demos.co.uk/files/Resilient_Nation_-_web-1.pdf [accessed 
24/02/2021]
A NEW MODEL OF RESILIENCE
Our Build Back Stronger agenda goes beyond the 
boundaries of conventional resilience and security 
strategy, to consider the full range of factors that 
affect our ability to respond to, and recover from, 
shocks. This section of the report builds on a 2009 
Demos paper by Charlie Edwards, Resilient Nation. 
In Resilient Nation, Edwards made the case that 
citizens and communities needed to be brought 
into emergency response systems: their agility and 
social capital make them far more able to prevent 
as well as respond to disasters. “Next generation 
resilience relies on citizens and communities, not the 
institutions of the state”, he argued.73
The pandemic showed how prescient this was. 
National shielding support schemes, national test 
and trace, and national volunteering programmes 
were regularly out-performed by their local 
counterparts. And, as we explored in the previous 
section, hyper-local community organising delivered 
not just direct aid, but a national morale boost, 
too. So community building is clearly an essential 
component of any future resilience strategy.
We have identified four more:
Individual and family-level financial resilience
Low pay and low savings ratios make millions of 
families financially fragile. With no savings and low 
sick pay, individuals and their families had little 
cushion to fall back on. That makes our whole 
economic system more fragile and increases the 
pressure on the state for emergency aid if and 
when a crisis hits. And as we saw above, low pay 
and financial fragility make it harder for people to 
take the actions needed to respond in a crisis - like 
self-isolating. If they can’t afford to lose a day’s pay, 
people are more likely to take risks, whether that’s 
exposing themselves to Covid-19 right now, or 
risking travelling to work in flood conditions in the 
next crisis.
Public health and wellbeing
We are not healthy enough: we have high levels 
of obesity, diabetes and hypertension, all of which 
are risk factors for severe disease - not just with a 
Covid-19 infection but in almost any pandemic. 
There’s a mental health dimension too: with high 
levels of anxiety and depression, our ability to 
manage the impact of trauma and crisis can be 
impaired. Other issues - closely correlated with 
poverty - like food insecurity, fuel poverty, and 
loneliness all reduce our resilience too.
35
Trade flows
As we saw above, interruptions in our food supply, 
and the global race to secure adequate PPE took the 
public by surprise. There is a strong consensus for 
a new approach to improving the resilience of our 
essential supply chains. The government is exploring 
this through its Project Defend.
Integrity of public information systems
Social media networks have long been under 
scrutiny for the information ecosystems they have 
created. Before the pandemic, foreign interference 
in elections was the focal point of fear about online 
disinformation harming our society. The pandemic 
has brought to the fore how public health can rely, 
in a much more fundamental sense, on healthy, 
well-managed information environments where 
engagement is not driven by fear.
We have seen platforms being much more 
proactive when it comes to dealing with Covid-19 
misinformation than on other online harms. Platforms 
like Facebook and Twitter have labelled and 
removed misinformation, pushed good information 
and directed users to authoritative sources, and 
altered their advertising policies to ban anti-vax 
ads and give free ads to health services.74, 75, 76, 77, 
78 But this response has been inconsistent and its 
success is unclear. Experts commented to us that, 
though platforms had taken more steps against 
misinformation than usual, they had repeatedly 
delayed taking the most significant steps like 
banning ads from anti-vaxxers, rather than doing 
so early on.79 Meanwhile, some states have used 
the crisis to further their own political aims through 
disinformation campaigns online.80 
Overall, both states and social media companies 
have been adapting and altering policy as they 
went along. There was, and still is, no established 
playbook for increasing access to and trust in 
reliable information, while reducing the risk of 
misinformation. That lack of a coherent information 
systems strategy,and a reactive focus on stamping 
out harms rather than building healthier alternatives, 
has hampered the pandemic response throughout 
and continues to affect vaccine hesitancy.
74 Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Sub-Committee on Online Harms and Disinformation. Oral evidence: Online Harms and Disinformation, 
HC 234. House of Commons, 2020. Available at https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/459/pdf [accessed 13/08/2020]
75 Hillier, L. As usage soars, what are social media platforms doing to help support and inform users. Econsultancy, 2020. Available at https://
econsultancy.com/coronavirus-as-social-media-usage-soars-what-are-platforms-doing-to-help-users-be-better-connected-informed-and-
supported/ [accessed 13/08/2020]
76 CCDH. Tech Company Claims. 2020. Available at https://www.counterhate.co.uk/tech-company-claims [accessed 13/08/2020]
77 Gregory, S., Kayyali, D and Faife C. Covid-19 Misinformation and Disinformation Responses: Sorting the Good from the Bad. WITNESS, 
2020. Available at https://blog.witness.org/2020/05/covid-19-misinformation-response-assessment/ [accessed 13/08/2020]
78 Tidy, J. Coronavirus: Facebook alters virus action after damning misinformation report. BBC News, 2020. Available at https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/technology-52309094 [accessed 13/08/2020]
79 CCDH. #WilltoAct: How social media giants have failed to live up to their claims on the Coronavirus ‘infodemic’. 2020. Available at www.
counterhate.co.uk/willtoact [accessed 13/8/2020]
80 Ricard, J. and Medeiros, J. Using misinformation as a political weapon: Covid-19 and Bolsonaro in Brazil. Harvard Misinformation Review, 
2020. Available at https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/using-misinformation-as-a-political-weapon-covid-19-and-bolsonaro-in-brazil/ 
[accessed 23/02/2021]
A comprehensive approach to resilience needs to 
focus on all five issues in an integrated way: trade 
flows and essential goods are only the beginning. 
Resilience strategies need to start with building up 
the financial and health resilience of individuals, 
families and communities, and ensuring access to 
high quality information for all.
A COHESIVE POLICY AGENDA
The policy agenda identified by the public through 
Renew Normal is well targeted to improve our 
resilience on all of these fronts. We looked above 
at trade policy, where public attitudes align closely 
with the priorities of Project Defend: improving our 
national resilience while staying open to trade and 
diverse supply chains.
Public demands for a major new levelling up agenda 
will also help improve resilience. Tackling low 
pay and precarious employment, and improving 
the protections of our welfare system will not just 
improve the finances and health of individual 
families, but the ability of those families to withstand 
future shocks, and so the resilience of our economic 




















The growing public consensus for building more 
inclusive, healthier and accessible online spaces - 
as set out above - will help build a more resilient 
information system, where individuals have access 
to more reliable, trusted sources of information, and 
harmful misinformation is harder to come by.
And a major investment in community development 
- including better access to green space and 
coordinated efforts to tackle food poverty - will help 
build the social capital and human connections that 
are so essential to effective disaster relief.
The diagram below shows the way in which the 
policy recommendations contained in this report will, 




















• Continue Project 
Defend.
• Values-based public 
trade dialogue.
• Improve low pay 
and the safety net.




• Prioritise community-led 




• Improve access to 
green space.
• Level up poverty 
with higher pay and 
stronger safety net.
• Improve care.
• Improve quality of 
online spaces.





This section is a short 
summary of all the policy 
proposals included in this 
report, for easier reference.
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KEY WORKERS AND LOW PAY
Government should:
Tackle low pay with:
• Increases in the minimum wage, and improved 
enforcement.
• Prioritising low paid public sector workers for a 
significant pay rise, including targeted funding to 
enable higher pay in private companies delivering 
public services, such as care.
Improve the safety net by:
• Extending sick pay to low paid workers.
• Increasing the rate of sick pay. 
• Making permanent the £20-a-week increase 
in Universal Credit, pending a wider review of 
sustainable welfare spending.
Improve opportunities and productivity with:
• A new education and training offer for all low paid 
workers
• A statutory entitlement to paid learning leave. 
TRADE AND RESILIENCE
We support the approach taken by Project Defend to 
improve the resilience of supply chains for essential 
goods and services.
We recommend the government:
• Engage the public in a consensus-building process, 
such as a citizens’ assembly, on the future direction 
of UK trade policy.
• Engage with other countries on the reform 
of multilateral institutions to provide greater 
protection and security against future shocks.
• Publish wider information on the expected impacts 
of a range of possible future shocks, opening 
this process up to greater public scrutiny and 
challenge.
It is also vital that we go beyond the question of 
supply chains in considering the real nature of 
national resilience. 
THE FUTURE OF HOME WORKING
Government should abandon efforts to intervene 
in the market and persuade or incentivise office 
workers back to their old patterns. Instead, it should 
support people through the transition.
81 Carnegie UK Trust. Learning from lockdown: 12 steps to eliminate digital exclusion. 2020. Available at https://d1ssu070pg2v9i.cloudfront.
net/pex/carnegie_uk_trust/2020/10/14161948/Carnegie-Learning-from-lockdown-Report-FINAL.pdf [accessed 19/2/2021]
82 Good Things Foundation. Coronavirus and Digital Inclusion. 2020. Available at https://www.goodthingsfoundation.org/coronavirus-and-
digital-inclusion [accessed 19/2/2021]
Flexible hours are overall more important to the 
population than the ability to work from home. We 
recommend the government:
• Work with industry, sector by sector, to identify 
ways to improve flexibility and ensure the lessons 
learned from this pandemic can spread to the 
whole economy. 
• Encourage the Civil Service and public sector to 
lead the way on using remote working to support 
the levelling up agenda, with a drive to increase 
remote working opportunities in areas where there 
is a lack of labour market opportunities. 
• Take a role in driving the transformation of city 
centres.
ONLINE LIFE AND MISINFORMATION
It is time for an ‘Everybody In’ approach to digital, 
focused on both infrastructure and skills. The 
government should:
• Recognise internet access as an essential need 
and invest significantly in digital infrastructure 
in less well-connected areas, as well as provide 
support to those who are unable to afford sufficient 
internet connection. We support the proposal of a 
Minimum Digital Living Standard.81
• Invest in upskilling people who are currently 
digitally excluded through lack of skills, focusing on 
supporting existing local authority or community 
organisations who are providing these services.82 
We need to redesign face-to-face services - in the 
public and private sector - developing a strategy 
alongside efforts to reinvent our urban spaces.
• Savings made by essential services moving online 
should be invested back into targeting offline 
services at the particular groups who most require 
them.
• National and local government should collaborate 
on creating innovative ‘front of house’ models 
for the full range of public services, including 
collaborating with the private sector.
And we need to build a better internet. Policy 
interventions should include:
• A duty of care on platforms should include 
requirements on platforms to empower users 
to report and reduce abuse online, including 
providing more transparent reporting tools, and 
processes for redress.
• An independent regulator should require data 
access from social media platforms, so that the 
incidence of harmful content and the effectiveness 
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of reporting, moderation and curation systems 
can be assessed by third-parties outside of the 
platforms themselves. 
• Tech platforms should invest in their human 
moderators, offering increased professional 




• Lead the process of reimagining their own urban, 
suburban, and rural spaces that are affected by 
economic and technological change. From high 
streets to new parkland: communities should be 
leading on design, and a major part of delivery.
• This should be funded by a mix of grants, asset 
transfers, and support for community businesses.
• Communities - who have been such a vital part of 
the response to food poverty - should be a major 
part of the National Food Strategy.
All our resilience planning should include efforts to 
build up social capital and community infrastructure 
that can be flexibly deployed at times of crisis.
• We should create a new measure of social capital, 
and its geographic distribution to inform policy 
making.
• The government’s levelling up agenda should aim 
to reduce inequality of social capital - as well as 
economic capital.
It is vital that efforts to increase volunteering and 
voluntarism does not become a political dividing 
line but a source of connection and optimism for the 
nation. That means we need to make sure it’s not 
covering up for cuts. 
Government should mitigate risks by ensuring public 
service funding keeps up with demand. It should 
also:
• Introduce new protections to ensure charities are 
not subsidising core NHS or other services.
• Guarantee statutory funding for hospices.
ACCESS TO GREEN SPACE
At the top of the agenda for the physical 
transformation of our urban and suburban spaces 
should be improved access to green space, in 
particular for those communities who have the least. 
Local and national government should:
• Create a new parks fund to support the reclaiming 
of disused urban land for green space - including 
both small community parks and strategic green 
space in major centres, to drive social and 
economic regeneration.
• Set a goal that no-one should live more than five 
minutes away from green space, and that every 
urban area should have at least one landmark park.
This is also an opportunity for community 
development and everyday democracy. As 
Covid-19 recedes, we can find new purpose for 
neighbourhood groups and community organisations 
in designing and managing new and existing green 
space. Local and national government should:
• Give more power to people in local decision 
making about future green spaces. 
• Encourage public engagement in managing green 
spaces on an ongoing basis.
• Ensure full community consultation over 
transport redesign proposals - like Low Transport 
Neighbourhoods - to increase walking and cycling. 
INEQUALITY
Levelling up needs to become an agenda to bring 
wellbeing and prosperity to a far wider range of left 
behind people and places, covering social as well as 
economic policy.
Levelling up should include:
• Renewed efforts to tackle low pay and improve the 
welfare safety net. 
• A major investment in building social capital in 
left-behind areas, through practical community 
projects.
• Huge expansion in access to green space, 
especially in left-behind areas, as part of a 
wellbeing strategy to reduce happiness inequality.
• A national programme to get Britain healthy, with 
targets to substantially reduce the gap between 
rich and poor on obesity, activity levels and 
smoking.
• Renewed commitments to level up opportunity, 
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practicable, remove from the Collective Work any reference to such Licensor or the Original Author, as requested.
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b You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that is primarily intended 
for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation. The exchange of the Work for 
other copyrighted works by means of digital file sharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or 
directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of any 
monetary compensation in connection with the exchange of copyrighted works.
c If you distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work or any Collective Works, 
you must keep intact all copyright notices for the Work and give the Original Author credit reasonable to the 
medium or means You are utilizing by conveying the name (or pseudonym if applicable) of the Original Author if 
supplied; the title of the Work if supplied. Such credit may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, 
however, that in the case of a Collective Work, at a minimum such credit will appear where any other comparable 
authorship credit appears and in a manner at least as prominent as such other comparable authorship credit.
5 Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer
a By offering the Work for public release under this License, Licensor represents and warrants that, to the best of 
Licensor’s knowledge after reasonable inquiry:
i Licensor has secured all rights in the Work necessary to grant the licence rights hereunder and to permit the lawful 
exercise of the rights granted hereunder without You having any obligation to pay any royalties, compulsory licence 
fees, residuals or any other payments;
ii The Work does not infringe the copyright, trademark, publicity rights, common law rights or any other right of any 
third party or constitute defamation, invasion of privacy or other tortious injury to any third party.
b Except as expressly stated in this licence or otherwise agreed in writing or required by applicable law, the work 
is licenced on an ‘as is’ basis, without warranties of any kind, either express or implied including, without limitation, 
any warranties regarding the contents or accuracy of the work.
6 Limitation on Liability
Except to the extent required by applicable law, and except for damages arising from liability to a third party 
resulting from breach of the warranties in section 5, in no event will licensor be liable to you on any legal theory for 
any special, incidental, consequential, punitive or exemplary damages arising out of this licence or the use of the 
work, even if licensor has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
7 Termination
a This License and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any breach by You of the terms 
of this License. Individuals or entities who have received Collective Works from You under this License, however, 
will not have their licences terminated provided such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with those 
licences. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 will survive any termination of this License.
b Subject to the above terms and conditions, the licence granted here is perpetual (for the duration of the 
applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor reserves the right to release the Work 
under different licence terms or to stop distributing the Work at any time; provided, however that any such election 
will not serve to withdraw this License (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, granted under the 
terms of this License), and this License will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as stated above.
8 Miscellaneous
a Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos offers to the recipient 
a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence granted to You under this License.
b If any provision of this License is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not affect the validity 
or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this License, and without further action by the parties to this 
agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and 
enforceable.
c No term or provision of this License shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to unless such waiver or 
consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with such waiver or consent.
d This License constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work licensed here. There 
are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to the Work not specified here. Licensor shall 
not be bound by any additional provisions that may appear in any communication from You. This License may not 
be modified without the mutual written agreement of Demos and You.
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Demos is a champion of people, ideas and 
democracy. We bring people together. We bridge 
divides. We listen and we understand. We are 
practical about the problems we face, but endlessly 
optimistic and ambitious about our capacity, 
together, to overcome them. 
At a crossroads in Britain’s history, we need ideas 
for renewal, reconnection and the restoration of 
hope. Challenges from populism to climate change 
remain unsolved, and a technological revolution 
dawns, but the centre of politics has been 
intellectually paralysed. Demos will change that. We 
can counter the impossible promises of the political 
extremes, and challenge despair – by bringing to 
life an aspirational narrative about the future of 
Britain that is rooted in the hopes and ambitions of 
people from across our country. 
Demos is an independent, educational charity, 
registered in England and Wales. (Charity 
Registration no. 1042046) 
Find out more at www.demos.co.uk
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